Let go of deadbeats while deliberating the future of Afghanistan

As the date of the UN Secretary-General led follow-up meeting of member-state and regional-organization special envoys on Afghanistan draws closer, political activism of the Taliban ousted figures in exile have intensified. Former governors, members of the parliament, affiliates of the political parties and the occupants of the higher echelons of power within the Afghan state have been active and vibrant. Familiar faces that dominated the Afghan political scene for two decades appear on media advertising new alliances and issuing statements in a bid to remind people involved in the Afghan affairs about their existence. This has been a successful ploy of the political elite over the decades and it has worked in their favor throughout Afghan conflict in general and over the course of last years in particular.  

While the former political figures have been successful in attracting the United Nations and other actors’ attention, there has hardly been analysis of the impact of their engagement. If pre-August 2021 peace negotiations are anything to go by, it may not be difficult to recognize the fact that the Taliban has not had an appetite for engaging with them. The limited encounters that did take place were more of ceremonial nature with no real bilateral engagement between the two sides of the table. Post August 2021 and after the Taliban ascend to power, the clarity has further emerged that the de facto authority is in no mood to dialogue and negotiate with the collective that the Taliban claim to have fought for two decades.

Besides measuring effectiveness of the exiled at the negotiation table with the de facto authorities, gauging public trust and interest in them is another, far more important aspect of the equation that needs consideration. While there is no formal opinion poll, going by Afghan mainstream and social media, one can clearly see that Afghans’ faith in the individuals and faces that represented them both at home and abroad starting from Bonn Conference in 2001 has faded. People of Afghanistan remember their destabilizing agendas motivated by personal interest and that of their groups.

Afghanistan once again emerged on the central agenda of the global community after the events of September 2001 that resulted in the intervention of international community in the country.  After two decades of conflict and civil war, it was an opportunity for Afghanistan to regain its progress on the road to stability and development.  The international donor community made serious investments for two long decades on social, economic and political development of Afghanistan. Introduction of a democratic state system, infrastructure and human capital development, institution building and investment on community mobilization, integration and civil engagement are a few to name that offered hope to the people of Afghanistan. A good indicator of public enthusiasm was nationwide participation of people in 2004 elections. However, all this development and progress was challenged on each and every turn of the two decades long epoch of republic by the same political elite.

Among the political exiles are those who constantly challenged the state authority and legitimacy by clinging to governmental positions exploiting ethnocentric political narrative, financial capital accumulated through illegal means and their ability to destabilize geographical areas of their dominance with the help of the warlords they housed and protected. Electoral rigging, post-election wrangling for security of their political interests and subsequent power sharing frustrated people with political processes. The wide spread corruption was world known phenomena that placed Afghanistan on the lower tiers of global corruption indices. Promoting social unrest through fueling ethnic tensions among people damaged social fabric of Afghanistan and constantly winded chasms among the Afghan communities that halted social integration and development. These are very few of the many ills that were inflicted on Afghanistan amidst a once in ages opportunity due to which Afghanistan regressed to where it is today.

The international community should have realized the destabilizing impact of the so-called political personalities who played a leading role in the disastrous civil war that was widely fought across Afghanitan after regime collapse in 1992. Most of the post-2001 political elite were either patrons or participants in the civil war of 1990s. However, the UN facilitated Bonn process placed them in the front row of the negotiation table to decide upon future of the country. Consequently, most of the predators of the civil war at once became the political elite of Afghanistan. Instead of being tried as part of transitional justice, the warlords made it to the aisles of power and more importantly, with an opportunity to further strengthen their positions by milking government and international community’s resources accumulated from kickbacks, corruption and misuse of authority besides winning contracts of supplies and service delivery from the international organization through their political influence.

It goes without saying that those who constantly threatened the state, collected enormous wealth over the years and enjoyed every bit of luxury during their time in power, fell like ninepins and escaped the country leaving people of Afghanistan without  leadership giving direction and guidance. Afghans still remember that fatal August fortnight concluding on 15th August when the self-imposed political elite left them amidst chaos and uncertainty in a bid for personal survival. As such, their current effort of gaining relevance and recognition is seen as nothing but an endeavor to restore their position besides reclaiming their assets and wealth they left behind after their escape from Afghanistan.

The United Nations and other stakeholders, as well as facilitators of dialogue among Afghans will have to look beyond the deadwood. The captured chess pieces have proven to the people of Afghanistan more than once that the warlords turned political figures are merely bothered about their personal interest and they hardly care about Afghan and Afghanistan. They had their chances not once, but twice and they miserably failed on both occasions. Their failure, however, has caused catastrophe, instability and brought calamity on the people of Afghanistan who are faced with egregious humanitarian situation that is being barely managed with the help of UN facilitated humanitarian assistance.

Learning from the past, the international community will have to change its course and start looking for viable alternatives. Afghanistan needs objective dialogue for political stability, transition and more importantly sustainable positive peace. There do exist substitutes to the tested and tried collective. The substitutes also have a vision for future of the country that lies beyond power sharing, armed violence and power grab through illegal means. Afghanistan is no more capable of facing another 1990s kind of civil war or political mayhem enshrined in power sharing of 2000s, the only solutions that the warlord turned politicians can offer.

Afghanistan has been able to produce an intellectual cadre over the course of last 20 years that is able to think through political transformation and offer a practical roadmap for the future of Afghanistan. Given the circumstances, a sizeable community of these intellectuals has been established in exile and a reasonable number of them are in Afghanistan too with firsthand experience of the ground realities. The international community will have to invest time and resources to map and identify them. An engagement with such groups and individuals will pave the way for communication and rendezvous with Taliban while also helping an alternative, more objective stream of Afghan leadership to discuss, debate and negotiate future of Afghanistan.

The diaspora intellectual community has started recovering from the shock of August 2021 and has gradually gathered themselves. They have been getting organized within different institutional structures in order to create space for internal dialogue, develop coherence in their vision and agree on a common agenda for future. Similarly, there are strong voices inside Afghanistan who have been able to play a pivotal role in raising concerns of the people and sharing them with the de facto authorities. These political and civil society activists, and intellectuals can play a critical role in leading a constructive dialogue, participating in objective discussion and mobilizing the reminder of the Afghan intellectual community who is in fringes at the moment. 

It is the right time for the international community led by the United Nations to learn from the history and take corrective measures while facilitating dialogue on Afghanistan. Repeating mistakes of the past and continuing with those who have been part of the problem will not help but further compound the situation by creating impasses between the Taliban regime and the Afghan political community. The impasses are doomed to block two-way communication between the de facto authorities and as such search for sustainable solution can go astray. At minimum, all efforts such as the upcoming Doha meeting, may fail to deliver the desired result which will subsequently diminish the little hope attached to the UN led efforts.   

Lessons for today’s Afganistan in Bacha Khan’s struggle

I wrote an article in Pashto langauge on the occaision of centinail of Tahreek-e-Islah Afghana (Movemment for reforming Afghan society) celebrated by the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. The movement was founded by the torch bearer of non-violence movement Abdulghaffar Khan, famously known as Bacha Khan. I have accumilated some lessonns for today’s Afghan society with a belief that learning from the century old movement can have major positive impact on the Afghan society.

In the week the Taliban advanced on Kabul, the grounds of Chamn-e-Huzuri still teemed with keen cricketers

I wrote for Australia based CodeSports on overall situation and cricket after the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan.

The article can be accessed from below link:

https://www.codesports.com.au/cricket/in-the-week-the-taliban-advanced-on-kabul-the-grounds-of-chamnehuzuri-still-teemed-with-keen-cricketers/news-story/579cc5e5d4b0923bfbea6b8a771a74ef

Out of the Ground: A Preliminary Assessment of the Afghan Cricket Board

I condcuted a study for Integrity Watch Afghanistan. Report of the study can be accessed in English, Dari and Pashto from below links:

English Version:

https://iwaweb.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/16-ACB-English-Report.pdf

Dari:

https://iwaweb.org/…/wp…/uploads/2020/09/ACB-Dari-Report.pdf

Pashto:

https://iwaweb.org/…/…/uploads/2020/09/ACB-Pashto-Report.pdf

The Missing Links in the Afghan Peace Process

The article was published by The Diplomat. Link to the article original source: https://thediplomat.com/2020/01/the-missing-links-in-the-afghan-peace-process/

William Zartman, the renowned scholar of conflict and peace studies, says that parties to a conflict agree to negotiate when they are faced with a mutually hurting stalemate. The Afghan conflict has apparently reached that stage of stalemate where none of the parties seem to be making advances in regard to deciding the situation in their favor. Therefore, the parties — namely the United States, the Afghan government, and the Taliban — have been willing to engage in dialogue to explore a viable solution to the nearly two-decade long conflict. The search for peace and reconciliation gained impetus when Zalmay Khalilzad was appointed as the United States’ special representative for the Afghan peace process in September 2018.

While the Afghan conflict has reached, to use Zartman’s word, “ripeness” and is ready for political dialogue over a settlement, the process has been facing many consistent roadblocks. This has halted the desired progress, causing a lot of anxiety among the stakeholders. The roller-coaster peace process has serious flaws, and without correcting those issues it will be nearly impossible to conclude negotiations successfully.

The major issue with the ongoing process is the lack of coordination, collaboration, and consensus between the United States and the Afghan government, the two strategic partners and common antagonists of the Taliban. Khalilzad, upon his appointment, undertook whirlwind shuttle diplomacy, traveling to all directions of interest vis-à-vis the Afghan conflict while setting an unrealistic timeline for striking a peace deal with the Taliban. In the process, he often ignored the Afghan government, leaving it suspicious of Khalilzad and his efforts. The rumors that generated from the December 2018 Abu Dhabi meeting with the Taliban about the possibility of replacing the elected Afghan government with a caretaker one added to the already sprouting distrust.

Besides the solo efforts of Khalilzad on the Afghan peace process, the scratchy relationship between Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and Khalilzad dating from their undergraduate days in Beirut is also cited as a reason behind the strained relations. The two leaders are reported to lack the chemistry that is sine qua non for any peace process to succeed. Consequently, the two strategic partners fell apart as the peace process progressed. Afghan National Security Adviser Hamdullah Mohib memorably criticized Khalilzad’s conduct, going so far as to saying the U.S. representative was behaving like a viceroy.

On the other hand, Kabul has lacked consistency and strategic vision in the peace process. While a comprehensive road map offered by Ghani in February 2018 during the Kabul conference and a subsequent unilateral ceasefire in June 2018 put the Taliban in a difficult position, the follow up to these initiatives was erratic. After announcing the road map in February, Ghani came up with yet another strategy for peace and reconciliation with the Taliban during the Geneva conference in October, sections of which nullified his February proposal. In the meantime, there has been a lot of rambling and wrangling around establishment of the negotiation team representing the Afghan government, another testimony of the lack of homework on the part of the presidential palace.

In addition, Ghani shifted his focus to the 2019 presidential election and his bid for another term in office. In the process, he lost his close aides and colleagues, leaving him with little human capital to rely upon to pursue his peace agenda. Furthermore, the election agenda upended whatever political consensus was accumulated during 2017 and 2018. The participation of Afghan political leaders in a Moscow meeting with the Taliban even after the presidential palace urged restraint was a clear example of discord among the political leadership and government. Add that to the fallout with the U.S. special representative and it’s no wonder the vision of peace and reconciliation has been tainted.

The Taliban, on the other hand, continue to push for the winner-takes-all approach. The Taliban have been ignoring the Afghan government throughout the process, hoping to reach a conclusion with the Americans. The most critical part of their approach has been the effort to belittle the Afghan government by shrugging off Kabul as rudimentary entity in the complex Afghan peace and reconciliation process. This compulsion of the Taliban can be understood in the light of fact that they need to maintain the intensity of their battlefield efforts, for which there is a need to present the Afghan state apparatus as enemy. Even then, a toned-down approach will help the whole process. Considering the fact that without engagement by the Afghan government it will be exceedingly difficult for the United States and the Taliban to reach a comprehensive peace deal, the Taliban have to reconsider their approach toward the sitting Afghan government.

The solution to the Afghan peace process conundrum is that all parties will have to try and reconcile their positons, connect the dots, and eliminate the missing links.  The parties will have to recognize the basic fact that peace is all about compromise and not triumph. Unless and until all come to terms with this basic understanding and adjust their agendas, it is almost impossible to reach a peaceful settlement.

The Americans, and more importantly Khalilzad, will have to walk shoulder-to-shoulder with the Afghan government in the push for peace with the Taliban. A solo flight will not only challenge the progress of the peace process but pose perils to the strategic partnership between the two countries. Therefore, as true strategic partners, Khalilzad will have to find a way of working in tandem with Ghani and his team.

On the other hand, Ghani and his team must change their attitude toward peace and reconciliation with the Taliban. In this regard, the office of the President of Afghanistan will have to reach out to all political figures and develop a consensus with them. Consensus with the political leadership and their broader engagement in the peace process will give the president much-needed clout to take the driver’s seat in the peace process.

And finally, the Taliban must recognize that without engaging with Kabul, any peace agreement will be incomplete and feeble. A vision for winning over any of the parties will certainly pose challenges to the Afghan peace and reconciliation process. Continuous effort toward undermining the Afghan government will do no favor to anyone but can certainly put the peace process on the path to failure, which will serve none of the conflict parties.

Although the peace process gained momentum after Khalilzad’s appointment in September 2018, it has already faced major setbacks. Still, there is reason for hope as there is still life in the process after the resumption of the talks by the Trump administration in the aftermath of an abrupt cancellation in September 2019. Nonetheless, corrective measures will have to be taken, and missing links will have to be connected by all parties, in order to ensure progress toward a durable solution to the Afghan conflict.